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Expert Evidence, Partisanship,  
and Epistemic Competence  
Jennifer L. Mnookin†  
In various ways, skilled witnesses have been used in 
courtroom processes since just about the dawn of the jury trial. 
The expert witness in its modern form—a witness whose 
presence in court results not from being a percipient witness to 
material facts, but instead because of education, training, 
experience, or other specialized knowledge relevant to the case, 
and who is called by one party to testify, and is typically 
compensated by that party as well—can be traced back to at 
least the middle of the nineteenth century. 
But the use of adversarial expert witnesses in court has 
been problematic from just about the moment of its invention. 
In this brief essay, I will explore two fundamental causes of the 
awkward fit between expert knowledge and our adjudicatory 
processes: the twin problems of partisanship and epistemic 
competence.  
The use of expert evidence in court has been criticized 
for a remarkably long time. Consider the following three 
quotations:  
But the practice [of using expert witnesses] under the present 
method has for years exhibited shortcomings which are lamen-
table. . . . The principal feature of the breakdown seems to be the 
distrust of the expert witness as one whose testimony is shaped  
by his bias for the party calling him. That bias itself is due, partly  
to the special fee which has been paid or promised him, and partly to 
his prior consultation with the party and his self-committal to a 
particular view. His candid scientific opinion thus has had no fair 
opportunity of expression, or even of formation, swerved as he is by 
this partisan committal.1  
  
 † Vice Dean for Faculty & Research and Professor of Law, UCLA School of 
Law. I thank the participants for an engaging and provocative symposium and 
particularly Margaret Berger and Larry Solan for organizing it. Thanks also to Jennie 
Katz and Janelle Ureta for research assistance.  
 1 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 563 (2d ed. 1923) (paragraph break omitted). 
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Experts in other fields see lawyers as unprincipled manipulators of 
their disciplines, and lawyers and experts alike see expert 
witnesses—those members of other learned professions who will 
consort with lawyers—as whores.2  
Now in the present instance I have, as usual, the evidence of experts 
on the one side and on the other, and, as usual, the experts do not 
agree in their opinion. There is no reason why they should. . . . A 
man may go . . . to half-a-dozen experts. . . . He takes their honest 
opinions, he finds three in his favor and three against him; he says 
to the three in his favor, “will you be kind enough to give evidence?” 
And he pays the three against him their fees and leaves them alone; 
the other side does the same. It may not be three out of six, it may be 
three out of fifty. I was told in one case, where a person wanted a 
certain thing done, that they went to sixty-eight people before they 
found one. . . . [T]herefore I have always the greatest possible 
distrust of scientific evidence of this kind.3  
These views span more than a century, but they sound a 
remarkably consistent note. Though the rhetorical styles are 
quite different, the underlying message is strikingly similar: 
Expert witnesses in court are often not deserving of our 
confidence. Their conclusions cannot be relied upon, and their 
words cannot be trusted. Indeed, a century’s worth of writing 
about expert evidence circles around the same themes and 
consistently reaches the same conclusion: that the use of party-
selected expert witnesses in an adversarial legal system is 
fraught with difficulties.4  
Why is this so? At root, the use of expertise in our 
adversarial system raises two equally significant fundamental 
dilemmas: the problem of partisanship and the problem of 
epistemic competence. First, given that experts are called by 
one party and paid by that party, there is an inevitable danger 
of bias in favor of that party. The less extreme version of this 
concern is that as the expert prepares for and becomes 
enmeshed in the case, he will increasingly, if unconsciously, 
  
 2 Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1991). 
 3 Thorn v. Worthing Skating Rink Co., L.R. 6 Ch.D. 415, 416 (1876) (Jessel, 
M.R.), quoted in Plimpton v. Spiller, L.R. 6 Ch.D. 412, 415 n.2 (1877). 
 4 For a look at the history of anxieties surrounding the use of expert 
evidence in court, see Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: 
An Intellectual History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILLA. L. REV. 763 (2007); see also TAL 
GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE 5-51 (2004); SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT 
THE BAR 42-68 (1995); JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW (1993); Christopher 
Hamlin, Scientific Method and Expert Witnessing: Victorian Perspectives on a Modern 
Problem, 16 SOC. STUD. SCI. 485, 488-89 (1986); Stephan Landsman, Of Witches, 
Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony, 
13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 139 (1995). 
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side with the party that hired him, lose some degree of 
objectivity, and slant his testimony in that party’s favor. The 
more dramatic version of the same fear is that some 
unscrupulous experts will literally offer themselves for hire, 
selling their opinions and their credentials to anyone who 
meets their price.5 
Despite these dangers, refusing to permit payment to 
experts is obviously not a viable option. It is wholly unrealistic 
to imagine that those highly qualified experts whom we want 
to have participating in our adjudicatory process would (or 
should) devote their time and energy to the courts pro bono on 
a regular basis. Preparing for and testifying for trial can be 
extremely time consuming, and experts can otherwise be 
spending that time engaging in other professionally and/or 
economically remunerative activities, or enjoying their favorite 
leisure activities. Hardly anyone would view giving expert 
testimony as one of her favorite leisure-time activities. The 
reality is that experts must be paid. 
The acute difficulty comes not simply from the fact of 
payment, but rather from the fact that it is the parties who 
choose and pay their experts. What a particular party views as 
the greatest value for its dollar—effective expert testimony 
that persuades the factfinder—will often not be commensurate 
with what a more systemic perspective would see as most 
valuable, which would presumably be careful, accurate expert 
testimony rather than testimony most persuasive to a non-
expert. What this means is that those witnesses who succeed in 
the marketplace for experts within our adversarial process will 
often not be those with the most knowledge or actual expertise 
in a particular area, but rather those whom parties believe will 
succeed in persuading the factfinder. The confluence of 
adversarialism with the need for expert information also has 
permitted the creation of a class of “professional” expert 
witnesses, those for whom expert witnessing is no longer a 
sideline, a once-in-a-while add-on to their primary work as a 
physician, economist, epidemiologist, statistician, or whatnot, 
but rather is now a significant, or even primary, source of their 
  
 5 For the classic (pre-Daubert) article on the widespread frustration with the 
use of expert evidence and the structural problems with the use of expert knowledge in 
an adversarial system with lay fact-finders, see Gross, supra note 2. For a polemical 
but influential account of the problems with the use of expert evidence in civil cases, 
see PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991). 
For a description of the significant concerns about partisanship in the late nineteenth 
century, see Mnookin, supra note 4.  
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earnings.6 This group, obviously, has an especially strong 
interest in maintaining its marketability by being a “team 
player,” and telling potential employers (that is, parties) what 
they want to hear. The marketplace for experts cannot, 
therefore, be trusted to produce reliable information.7 To 
whatever extent price can be correlated with quality in other 
domains, the relationship cannot be counted on with respect to 
expert witnesses.  
The second fundamental problem with the adversarial 
expert is epistemic. Experts are necessary precisely because of 
what the jury does not know.8 They are supposed to provide 
information useful to the jury’s decision-making that goes 
beyond what a jury would know without their assistance. But if 
the jury lacks the knowledge that the expert provides, how, 
then, can it rationally evaluate the expertise on offer?9 To be 
  
 6 As part of tort reform efforts, several states have attempted to curb 
“professional experts” in medical malpractice cases by statutory provisions limiting 
who can testify as an expert. Kansas, for example, requires that testifying experts have 
spent at least fifty percent of the two years preceding the incident giving rise to the 
claim in “actual clinical practice.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3412 (2007). Connecticut 
requires a testifying expert to have been active in the practice or teaching of medicine 
within the five years preceding the incident giving rise to the claim. CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 52-184c (2007). Michigan requires a testifying medical expert to have spent a 
majority of the year preceding the incident giving rise to the claim engaged in active 
clinical practice or teaching. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2169 (2008). 
 7 For an interesting look at the dynamics of the expert market, see Jeffrey L. 
Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls and 
Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2001). For a more optimistic perspective, 
see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
1477 (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert 
Witness, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1999, at 91.  
 8 Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which controls the use of expert testimony, 
states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony 
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702. In order to “assist the trier of fact,” the expert testimony must go 
beyond what the trier of fact would have known and understood even without the 
expert.  
 9 As Learned Hand wrote in his well-known 1901 article about expert 
evidence: 
The trouble with all this is that it is setting the jury to decide, where doctors 
disagree. The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, not facts, as we 
have seen, but general truths derived from his specialized experience. But 
how can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon an 
experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they 
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sure, one might not need to be an expert in order to assess 
expertise, but the main mechanisms for assessing expertise 
outside of one’s domain of knowledge are, by necessity, 
secondary indicia, proxies: demeanor, perhaps, or credentials, 
or superficial explanatory plausibility. But because each party 
has the power to select its experts from the whole universe of 
experts willing to testify, parties will presumably attempt to 
select those experts who best satisfy the parties’ best guesses 
about what the jury will use as its proxy criteria. That might be 
a Ph.D. from a prestigious institution or a lengthy publication 
record. Perhaps it is certain forms of speech or dress, or an 
honest face and a winning testimonial manner. Most likely it is 
a mixture of all of the above and more. Whatever the specific 
criteria, the point is that parties (sometimes with the help of 
jury consultants) will deliberately select experts who satisfy 
their beliefs about the jury’s expectations for experts. Parties 
will, quite rationally, seek out precisely those experts most 
capable of “performing” the role of expert in just the way that 
the parties expect that a jury will find credible. Parties do not 
have infinite latitude, as they will have to choose from 
whatever array of experts is willing to testify in a way that 
substantively helps their case. But compared to fact witnesses, 
they have a great deal of leeway.10 With fact witnesses, a party 
is typically severely limited by the happenstance of who was 
there and who saw what; not so with expert witnesses, who can 
be selected from a national or even global pool, resources 
permitting. As a result, the power of proxy criteria, like 
demeanor or credentials, to discriminate between reliable and 
unreliable experts is likely to be quite limited indeed.11  
  
are incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at all. . . . What 
hope have the jury, or any other layman, of a rational decision between two 
such conflicting statements each based upon such experience. 
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54-55 (1901).  
 10 Gross, supra note 2, at 1126-28. 
 11 Demeanor as a signal for credibility may not be particularly accurate 
outside of the expert context either. See generally Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the 
Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness 
Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157 (1993); Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991). My point, however, is not to defend (or attack) demeanor 
as an accurate means by which to detect honesty, but simply to suggest that whatever 
degree of utility it has for the assessment of credibility for non-expert evidence, it is 
significantly diminished vis-à-vis experts themselves because parties can select them 
precisely for their demeanor.  
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Moreover, the problem of epistemic competence com-
pounds the problem of partisanship. Because the jury does  
not have the expertise to evaluate the substance of expert 
testimony, it is unlikely that it will be an accurate evaluator  
of partisan bias. If the jury has epistemic competence, we may 
not need to be overly concerned with partisanship. The jury can 
independently evaluate the substance of the testimony and  
will often have the capacity to see through overstatements or 
inaccuracies that were the result of zealotry. Without epistemic 
competence, the jury has no choice but to rely on proxies as 
secondary indicia of bias, and these may often be either 
inaccurate or difficult to evaluate.  
For example, does the $550 per hour received by the 
expert mean that his testimony should be discounted because 
he is reaping a tidy profit, or does it reflect his high stature and 
commensurate ability that commands an appropriately high 
price? Is it a sign of trouble that an expert has testified dozens 
of times before, and thus might be an “expert for hire,” or is it a 
positive sign, showing that other judges have already deemed 
him sufficiently expert to warrant being heard by the jury? 
Does the fact that the plaintiff’s expert seems to testify 
exclusively for plaintiffs suggest a deep-seated bias, or is the 
expert who testifies for plaintiffs and defendants alike a bigger 
concern, possibly suggesting that he will testify for anyone who 
meets his price? How much, if it all, should a published study 
in a peer-reviewed journal be discounted because it was funded 
by a private entity, such as a drug company, with an interest in 
the outcome of the research conducted? On the one hand, such 
a funding source could generate a bias; on the other hand, the 
structure of academic research and the processes of peer review 
and publication are designed, at least aspirationally, to check 
such a bias. What about a study conducted especially for this 
lawsuit? Is its trustworthiness diminished because it did not 
emerge through the typical research process,12 or is it the quite 
appropriate result of an expert, or community of experts, 
developing an interest in the relevant question precisely 
because of the lawsuit itself? The point is not that secondary 
indicia can never provide information relevant to an evaluation 
of partisanship—rather, it is that evaluating these secondary 
  
 12 This is precisely what Judge Kozinski suggested in his opinion on remand 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (1995). 
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indicia is a murky and imperfect process given the combination 
of (1) adversarialism and (2) a lack of epistemic competence.  
These are not new problems. They are, in fact, rather 
old problems. Indeed, the risks posed by expert testimony—the 
danger of partisanship and the problem of epistemic 
competence—have long been recognized, but never fully 
resolved, especially when considered together. And hence we 
continue to face these problems—in court, in our scholarship, 
in the jury room. Given these fundamental and seemingly 
irresolvable problems with experts in court, what is the law  
to do?  
In what follows, Part I will survey the traditional, 
historical approaches the law has taken in attempting to 
resolve these central problems of partisanship and epistemic 
competence. Part II will then consider potential solutions to 
these fundamental quandaries, evaluating both the theoretical 
appeal and pitfalls of these approaches. 
I.  THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE SPORTING THEORY, 
FRYE, AND DAUBERT  
First, let us look at what the law has done. The 
traditional common law approach to these structural dilemmas 
was quite simply the adversarial mechanism itself: both parties 
had an equal opportunity to make use of expert witnesses if 
they wished to do so. Yes, the witnesses for each party might 
tend to partisanship, but somehow from their clashing 
testimony, the jury in its infinite wisdom would distill the 
truth—or at least that was the hope. It was a “sporting theory 
of justice” applied to experts: so long as parties had an equal 
opportunity to bring forward opposing experts, under the same 
rules and with the same judge as umpire, then whatever the 
jury made of the competing experts’ stories was acceptable.13  
This approach, however, was roundly criticized as early 
as the closing decades of the nineteenth century.14 The problem 
was the lack of epistemic competence: if juries could be counted 
on to have the ability to assess the expertise before them, then 
a level adversarial-playing field might indeed have been all 
that was needed. But given that juries often lacked the 
  
 13 On the sporting theory of justice, see Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 14 AM. LAW. 445, 447-48 (1906). 
 14 For a detailed look at views about expert evidence at the end of the 
nineteenth century, see generally Mnookin, supra note 4.  
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competence to adequately evaluate the expertise on offer, the 
“sporting theory of justice” had the effect, as Roscoe Pound 
noted, of turning “expert witnesses[] into partisans pure and 
simple.”15  
Although critiques of expert testimony have been both 
frequent and strongly worded over the course of the twentieth 
century, the adversarial expert has remained an increasingly 
significant feature of the adversarial trial. And for the most 
part, despite criticisms, the adversarial process itself remained 
the dominant check, such as it was, on expert testimony until 
quite recently.  
There were, to be sure, some earlier fledgling efforts to 
regulate the content of expert testimony through limitations on 
admissibility. The Frye rule, articulated in 1923, made explicit 
that for novel kinds of expert testimony, courts could require 
the knowledge to have gained “general acceptance” in the 
relevant expert community before permitting it before a jury.16 
But Frye, though it became important in the 1970s, was not 
much noticed at the time it was decided. Through 1970, it was 
cited only fifty-eight times, and the bulk of those cases involved 
the lie detector, the same technology at issue in Frye.17 
Instead, the main vehicle for such regulation as the 
courts wished to exercise was qualifications: in order to testify, 
the expert had to have qualifications that were adequate to 
support his claim of expertise. Just how qualified was qualified 
enough? No doctrinal framework emerged to answer this 
question, and in practice, most judges, most of the time, did not 
actually interrogate a proposed experts’ bona fides in a detailed 
or rigorous way. In addition, trial judges’ determinations about 
qualifications were generally viewed as so much a matter of the 
trial court’s discretion as to be virtually unreviewable on 
  
 15 Pound, supra note 13, at 448. 
 16 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye’s now 
classic and oft-quoted key language says: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in 
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and 
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a 
well-recognized scientific principle of discovery, the thing from which the 
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs. 
Id.  
 17 This is based on a search for cases reported by Lexis decided prior to 1970 
that cite Frye.  
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appeal.18 In practice, then, the only significant check on 
partisanship or even outright charlatanry was the power of the 
opposing attorney to cross-examine the expert. Even if one did 
agree with John Henry Wigmore that, as a general matter, 
cross-examination counted as “the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth,”19 it was often not terribly 
effective when applied to expert witnesses.20 
The net result was that although few defended it as 
sound, the “sporting theory” as applied to expert witnesses 
continued to reign even into the last quarter of the twentieth 
century. Few doubted that this sporting theory sometimes led 
to embarrassing results.21 Some critics began suggesting that 
the inadequate regulation of expert witnesses was even 
contributing to a liability crisis, in which socially valuable 
products were being forced off the market because of the cost of 
defending against baseless tort suits. These critics’ idea was 
that such lawsuits often lacked scientific merit, but plaintiffs’ 
lawyers were nonetheless able to hoodwink the jury into 
granting sizeable verdicts. And, according to the critics, these 
suits were able to get past summary judgment and reach trial 
precisely because of the presence of hubristic experts prepared 
to testify to causation with little or no basis in fact.22  
This, then, was the historical backdrop for the Supreme 
Court’s 1993 pronouncement on expert evidence, Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.23 As a formal matter, 
Daubert held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, which became 
effective in 1975, did not incorporate the Frye principle of 
  
 18 1 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 561, 670.  
 19 Id. vol. 3, § 1367. 
 20 For a satirical look from the late nineteenth century making fun of several 
kinds of expert witnesses (and illustrating the ineffectiveness of efforts to cross-
examine them), see RICHARD HARRIS, HINTS ON ADVOCACY (St. Louis, Central Law 
Journal Co., 9th ed. 1892) (1880).  
 21 For one classic example on the civil side, see Maihafer ex rel. Wells v. 
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985). This case, a bench trial in 
which the judge believed the plaintiffs’ experts who alleged that spermicide caused 
birth defects, has been much criticized. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 2, at 1121-24. But 
see Joseph L. Gastwirth, The Need for Careful Evaluation of Epidemiological Evidence 
in Product Liability Cases: A Reexamination of Wells v. Ortho and Key 
Pharmaceuticals, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK, 151, 163-89 (2003). For some examples 
of embarrassingly unsupported expert evidence admitted on the criminal side, see, e.g., 
Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate 
Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007), and Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific 
Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 439 (1997).  
 22 The classic account making this argument is HUBER, supra note 5. 
 23 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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“general acceptance.”24 While rejecting the allegedly “austere 
standard” of Frye, Daubert parsed the language of Rule 702 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and interpreted the rule’s use of 
the words “scientific . . . knowledge” to mean that federal 
judges have an obligation to serve as “gatekeepers,” who make 
sure that scientific evidence offered in court is, in fact, 
“scientific knowledge.”25 By emphasizing a judicial gatekeeping 
role for the assessment of expert evidence, Daubert was a 
meaningful move away from a pure “sporting theory” with 
respect to expert evidence.  
Tracing the history of expert evidence, Daubert 
completes a shift in perspective whose outlines were already 
implicitly visible in Frye. Prior to Frye (and to a great extent 
afterwards as well), the key concern was qualifications: Is this 
“expert” an appropriate person to speak to the issue at hand? 
Does this person, through training, experience, or education 
have the right kind of expertise? Do his credentials qualify him 
to give the jury an opinion on this matter? The courts, to be 
sure, were not typically extremely strict about qualifications—
physicians, for example, were often permitted to testify outside 
their primary area of expertise, and somewhat weak creden-
tials were often seen as going to evidentiary weight rather than 
admissibility—but still, qualifications were the primary hook 
by which judges evaluated an expert’s authority. The Frye test, 
by contrast, was less concerned with the speaker and his 
qualifications and was more concerned with the substance 
being asserted: had the speaker’s claims reached general 
acceptance in the relevant field? At least in theory, an 
indisputably qualified expert, even though testifying to matters 
within his sphere of expertise, could still be excluded under 
Frye because his conclusions lacked general acceptance within 
the appropriate expert community.  
But well after 1923 many courts ignored Frye, and even 
those courts that followed it often applied it in a form that 
reverted back to a qualifications test. They found that the test 
was satisfied so long as the properly qualified expert asserted 
that the substance of his claims was, in fact, generally 
accepted. Why should a court believe an expert’s say-so about 
general acceptance? Why, precisely because the expert had the 
appropriate qualifications. Not only does such logic have a 
  
 24 Id. at 588. 
 25 Id. at 589-91. 
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certain unavoidable circularity, but to the extent a credentialed 
expert’s own say-so is deemed adequate to establish general 
acceptance, a test that seems superficially different in form 
amounts to nothing but another version of a qualifications test. 
Daubert, by contrast, makes clear that for scientific evidence, 
qualifications alone ought not to suffice. The speaker’s 
individual expertise is still necessary, but it is no longer 
sufficient. Rather, the key question is whether the substance 
offered by the speaker has adequate indicia of reliability.26 
Daubert thus marks a doctrinal shift away from a focus on the 
speaker as a person and toward a focus on the validity of the 
claims made. 
More generally, Daubert was certainly a response to the 
twin concerns about partisanship and the epistemic 
competence of juries. As always, adequate qualifications 
remain a necessary prerequisite, but after Daubert, it is crystal 
clear that an expert’s qualifications are not, themselves, a 
sufficient condition for admissibility. Instead, the judge must 
examine the substance of the expert testimony to see whether 
it is adequately reliable. Counter-expertise introduced by an 
opposing party can, after Daubert, no longer be said to be an 
adequate cure for the problem of partisanship; rather, judges 
must themselves establish that the expert evidence has 
adequate indicia of reliability.  
But even though Daubert can be seen as something of a 
response to the twin concerns of partisanship and epistemic 
competence, it can hardly be said to resolve these issues. 
Daubert’s approach is to have a non-scientist judge make a 
preliminary determination about reliability in order to limit 
what the jury can consider. Nothing in Daubert explicitly 
addresses partisanship (though to be sure, part of the purpose 
of gate-keeping for reliability is to endeavor to distinguish 
partisan excess from legitimate expertise). And, as many have 
suggested, beginning with Rehnquist in his Daubert dissent 
and continuing as a leitmotif, it is far from clear that judges 
have the epistemic competence to make legitimate decisions 
about what expert evidence is adequately valid and what is 
not.27 
  
 26  Id. at 589-90. 
 27  See id. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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II. PARTISANSHIP AND EPISTEMIC COMPETENCE: 
CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
If Daubert represents, at best, an indirect and partial 
effort to address the issues of partisanship and epistemic 
competence, what would more direct efforts look like? In what 
follows, I want to suggest, unfortunately, just how difficult it is 
to solve these problems. I will briefly address the two most 
obvious and often-proposed solutions for the twin difficulties of 
partisanship and epistemic competence, and will suggest, alas, 
that that these solutions offer less than meets the eye—that 
upon reflection, they are not in fact satisfying solutions to the 
problems besetting expert testimony. 
First, let us look at solutions that face up to these 
fundamental tensions directly. If the problems with expert 
evidence in the adversary system are partisanship and 
epistemic competence, it might seem like the obvious solution 
is to take on one, the other, or both. How might this be done? 
For partisanship, it would seem that the obvious solution is to 
make experts non-partisan—to make them neutral or court 
appointed, answering to someone other than one of the parties. 
For epistemic competence, it would seem like the obvious 
solution would be to employ decision-makers or arbiters with 
epistemic competence: in other words, expert judges or expert 
juries.  
Each of these solutions has been suggested before. Each 
will no doubt be suggested again. If history is any guide, we are 
unlikely to head terribly far down either path within the trial 
process itself. I want to suggest, however, that while each of 
these potential solutions does address one piece of the 
underlying structural dilemma, neither offers a sound 
alternative for resolving the fundamental structural tensions 
as a whole. 
A.  Partisanship, Neutral Experts, and Evidence Synthesis 
Back in 1901, the young Learned Hand penned a still-
cited article examining the difficulties posed by the use of 
expert evidence. His proposed solution was to create a system 
for neutral, court-appointed experts, unbiased advisors who 
would be able to deliver to the jury “those general truths, 
applicable to the issue, which they may treat as final and 
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decisive.”28 Hand was far from the first to think that neutral 
experts were a promising way to solve the problems associated 
with experts in court,29 and throughout the century that 
followed a great number of subsequent critics proposed 
variations on the same solution.30 There have been proposals 
for court-appointed experts, for government-appointed experts; 
for neutrals in lieu of party-controlled experts, for neutrals as a 
supplement to party-controlled experts, for incentive schemes 
to encourage opposing parties to agree on a neutral expert, and 
so on. For our purposes, the great variety of possible 
institutional designs for the use of neutral experts is not the 
point.31  
The idea of neutrals is obviously an attractive corrective 
to the problem of partisanship. If one of the significant 
problems with the use of expertise in court is that that experts 
tend to be biased in favor of the party that hired them, then 
creating a category of expert that lacks this bias would seem 
like a natural way to improve the information available to the 
factfinder. The main advantage neutral experts would offer is 
precisely that they would not be (metaphorically) in bed with 
one of the parties.  
To the extent experts are corrupted by their association 
with the parties, the use of neutral experts could indeed be 
beneficial. But to see them as a panacea misunderstands the 
nature of most scientific disputes that arise at trial. Neutrals 
will only offer an adequate solution to the problems besetting 
the use of experts in court when, in fact, there is a reasonably 
high degree of consensus within the scientific community on 
the scientific question at issue in the case.  
  
 28 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert 
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 55 (1901). 
 29 For still earlier calls for neutral or court appointed experts, see, e.g., 
Emory Washburn, Testimony of Experts, 1 AM. L. REV. 45, 61-62 (1867); J.B. Ransom, 
Medical Expert Testimony, 16 MEDICO-LEG. J. 30, 31-34 (1899); Henry Mott, Expert 
Testimony, 11 MEDICO-LEG. J. 44, 45 (1893); Clemens Herschel, Services of Experts in 
the Conduct of Judicial Inquiries, 21 AM. L. REV. 571, 577 (1887). 
 30 For a sampling of these more contemporary calls for the greater use of 
neutral or court appointed experts, see MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH 
OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996); Gross, supra 
note 2; Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Impact of Daubert and Its Progeny on 
the Admissibility of Behavioral and Social Science Evidence, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
3 (1999). 
 31 Note, however, that under current law, courts do have the power to appoint 
experts when they deem it necessary. See FED. R. EVID. 706. This power, however, is 
rarely exercised.  
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Some of the time, this is no doubt the case. By the time 
Daubert went to trial, for example, the question of whether the 
drug Bendectin, frequently prescribed to treat acute morning 
sickness during pregnancy, was teratogenic had received an 
enormous amount of scientific attention (in significant part due 
to the wave of litigation surrounding it). Though there were 
still credentialed scientists who disagreed (some of whom were 
hired by the plaintiffs), it is fair to say that the great weight of 
scientific opinion interpreted the existing evidence as sufficient 
in quantity and quality to strongly support the inference that 
Bendectin was not teratogenic.32  
But in many cases, there may be genuine disagreement 
across the scientific community about how to interpret the 
existing evidence on causation. Take a toxic torts case in which 
the plaintiff claims that her harm resulted from exposure to a 
substance produced by the defendant. Often the key issue in 
such cases is causation; there may be no doubt that the 
plaintiff was harmed, but the question is whether it was the 
defendant’s product that caused the harm. Frequently, when 
plaintiffs bring suit, there will not be as much direct evidence 
on the question of causation as practicing scientists would hope 
to see before rendering a judgment about causation, because 
the studies that could, in theory, provide this information have 
quite simply never been conducted. The plaintiff might have a 
variety of suggestive pieces of data from a variety of fields—
perhaps a mixture of animal studies, chemical structure 
evidence, toxicology, and epidemiology, though perhaps the 
epidemiological studies are based on populations dissimilar to 
the plaintiff, or exposure rates that differ dramatically, or 
perhaps look at different, but chemically related, substances to 
the one at issue in the case. This was the case, at least 
arguably, in General Electric v. Joiner, the second of the 
Supreme Court’s trilogy on expert evidence.33 It is quite often 
the case in toxic tort litigation that the quantum of data 
investigating the question of causation is simply less 
voluminous than one would like. Such was the case with 
Parlodel, a lactation-suppressing drug removed from the 
  
 32 See generally MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE 
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS, 
BENDECTIN ON TRIAL (1998); Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony 
on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1993).  
 33  See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143-45 (1997). The Court 
upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude the plaintiff’s expert evidence and grant 
summary judgment with respect to PCB exposure. Id. at 146-47 
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market by the Food and Drug Administration when concerns 
emerged about whether it might be spurring strokes in some 
women who took it after childbirth.34  
Moreover, when a toxic tort claim involves a rare event 
rather than a potential mass tort, research on causation will 
almost certainly be scarce or even non-existent. In Zuchowicz v. 
United States, for example, the plaintiff claimed that the 
negligent misprescription of an overdose of the drug Danocrine 
caused her to develop an extremely rare and often fatal illness, 
primary pulmonary hypertension (“PPH”).35 Quite apart from 
the fact that there were, for obvious reasons, no studies of 
whether overdoses of that drug caused PPH, there was quite 
scant evidence on the question of whether Danocrine was 
capable in the first place of causing PPH: nothing more than a 
set of speculative claims by a pharmacologist who had a theory 
about how Danocrine could cause a series of hormonal 
imbalances that could, in combination, cause physical problems 
leading to PPH, coupled with testimony by the plaintiff’s 
treating physician, a leading pulmonologist, whose conclusions 
about causation were based in significant part on expertise in 
other drugs that cause pulmonary disease.36 The lack of other 
available evidence was in no way the plaintiff’s fault. The 
likelihood that extremely rare events will have been carefully 
studied is, well, extremely low. And even for toxic tort claims 
that affect a significant number of people, there may be quite 
limited evidence available when the first lawsuits are brought; 
indeed, it may often be the litigation and the ensuing publicity 
that spurs scientific interest in studying the question of 
causation more carefully.  
In cases where the evidence supporting causation is 
more limited than one would wish it to be, the questions for the 
scientist are particularly difficult: How do you aggregate the 
variety of imperfect evidence into a conclusion about general 
causation? How do you assess the disparate items and make a 
judgment about the probability that the substance is capable of 
causing the harm at issue? Evidence synthesis is an especially 
  
 34 For discussions of Parlodel, see Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, 
Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 269-70 
(2005); Margaret Cronin Fisk, Courts Split on Parlodel: Expert Testimony Good in Ala., 
Rejected in Ill., NAT'L L.J., Oct. 8, 2001, at A9. 
 35  Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 36 See id. at 385-86. 
1024 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:3 
difficult and methodologically fraught area.37 There are 
certainly field norms about “hierarchies of evidence” (for 
example, randomly controlled trials, or even better, a meta-
analysis of a number of different randomly controlled studies 
are typically thought of as the “gold standard,” and anecdotal 
case observations the weakest forms of evidence38); and there 
are rules of thumb about how to assess the likelihood of 
causation by looking at a variety of factors. (The well-known 
Hill’s criteria, for example, in epidemiology, direct attention to 
matters like temporal relationship, dose-response relationship, 
biological plausibility, consistency of the observed correlation, 
and a variety of other factors.39) But there are not, for the most 
part, terribly well-developed methodologies for quantitative 
synthesizing of disparate kinds and categories of evidence. 
Engaging in evidence synthesis, many scientists would agree, 
is as much an art as a science, inevitably involving methods 
that are not fully specified and the exercise of experience-
based—and somewhat subjective—judgment.40  
Even when the evidence is of a similar kind (perhaps a 
variety of different epidemiological studies), and meta-analytic 
techniques for formally synthesizing the evidence might be 
possible, there must first be a determination about which 
evidence is valid enough to be worth considering and which is 
not. Reputable, talented scientists may well disagree in good 
faith about what evidence is worth counting and what evidence 
ought to be dismissed from consideration altogether for 
methodological flaws.  
  
 37 Although scientists in a variety of fields concern themselves with the 
dilemmas of evidence synthesis on a regular basis, there has not been a great deal of 
discussion of this issue in the legal literature. See generally COMMITTEE ON DAUBERT 
STANDARDS & COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW, NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 
DISCUSSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DAUBERT STANDARDS: SUMMARY OF MEETINGS 11-
16 (Kathi E. Hanna & Anne-Marie Mazza, rapporteurs, 2006).  
 38 See, e.g., ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL 
RESEARCH 211 (2d ed. 1986); Robin Harbour & Juliet Miller, A New System for 
Grading Recommendations in Evidence Based Guidelines, 323 BRIT. MED. J. 334, 334-
36 (2001). 
 39  Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or 
Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295, 295-305 (1965). 
 40 To recognize that complex tasks of evidence synthesis have an inevitable 
subjective component using current methodologies is not to disparage the efforts by 
scientists to engage in such synthesis. There are, to be sure, significant efforts of this 
kind, especially in medicine, efforts to put together systematic reviews of all that is 
known and to draw conclusions from them in order to influence clinical practice. The 
Cochrane Collaboration is one of the best known and most respected of such efforts. See 
generally http://www.cochrane.org/docs/descrip.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).  
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Take, for example, the important public health question 
of whether regular mammograms for all women over the age of 
forty can help to reduce breast cancer mortality rates. This 
question arose not in the context of litigation, but as a critical 
public health issue with implications for what advice doctors 
should give to their female patients. Two groups of scientists 
carefully studied all the (considerable) available data on the 
subject.41 But each group’s decisions about what data 
warranted consideration differed.42 A review by Danish 
researchers decided that many of the studies had been too 
methodologically flawed to warrant consideration, and thus 
they based their analysis on a more limited number of studies 
that were deemed adequate; the other review, completed by the 
United States Preventative Task Force, agreed that many of 
the studies were flawed, but determined that the studies it 
deemed only “fair” were not so poor in quality that they should 
be altogether excluded from consideration.43 Because of these 
divergences in what evidence was deemed worthy of consider-
ation, the two studies reached quite disparate conclusions. The 
first analysis found that women in their forties do not, in  
the aggregate, benefit from mammograms and in fact have 
increased risk of harms because of unnecessary treatments and 
surgeries that mammogram results generate. The second 
study, by contrast, found that mammography did reduce 
mortality and was, on balance, beneficial.44 How could qualified 
scientists disagree about which studies were even worthy of 
consideration? As epidemiologist Steve Goodman wrote in an 
editorial on the controversy:  
Judgment determines what evidence is admissible and how strongly 
to weigh different forms of admissible evidence. When there is 
consensus on these judgments and the data are strong, an illusion is 
created that the evidence is speaking for itself and that the methods 
are objective. But this episode should raise awareness that judgment 
cannot be exercised from the process of evidence synthesis and that 
the variation of this judgment among experts generates uncertainty 
  
 41 See Steve Goodman, Editorial, The Mammography Dilemma: A Crisis for 
Evidence-Based Medicine, 137 ANNALS INT. MED. 363 (2002).  
 42  Id. at 363. 
 43 Id.  
 44 See id.; see also Gina Kolata, New Mammogram Studies Divided on 
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2002.  
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just as real as the probabilistic uncertainty of statistical 
calculations.45 
What does this public health debate have to do with 
experts in court and the limitations of neutral experts? It 
provides a dramatic illustration of a generalizeable point: while 
the partisanship of experts may create the illusion of 
disagreement even when little exists in the broader 
community, even in situations far removed from the use of 
“hired guns” in court, significant interpretive disagreements 
can occur among scientists operating in good faith—and this 
may be so even in instances when the available quantity of 
data is unusually substantial. Evidence synthesis is an 
especially complex and fraught area, one in which reputable 
scientists may simply disagree about the extent to which an 
imperfect body of data justifies an inference of causation. While 
partisanship may exacerbate these differences, and the lure of 
high pay may risk creating the appearance of disagreement 
when it would be unlikely to exist outside of the courtroom, the 
converse is simply not true: interpretive disagreement is not 
necessarily the result of partisanship. It may well be the 
product of genuine methodological and interpretive differences, 
not only across scientific disciplines, but even within them.  
Evidence synthesis, to be sure, is simply one salient 
illustration of a still more general point: scientific disagree-
ments are not, in and of themselves, a sign that something is 
amiss, nor do they necessarily suggest that one or both parties 
to the dispute are misbehaving partisans. Quite the contrary; 
disagreement is an integral part of scientific processes. What 
this means, however, is that the use of neutral experts may 
bring with it significant risks.46  
To be sure, in those cases in which one side’s experts  
are truly charlatans or have been led by partisan zeal to 
dramatically overstate some aspects of their testimony, 
neutrals could offer an effective and welcome check. But what 
would the use of neutrals on a more regular basis mean in 
those cases in which the disagreements among experts reflect 
legitimate differences, differences that the parties’ experts 
would hold equally fast to outside of the context of litigation or 
  
 45 Goodman, supra note 41, at 364.  
 46 On the advantages and disadvantages of court appointed experts, see 
generally Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses, Scientific Positivism 
Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 99-121 (1998).  
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even without the incentive of receiving fees? In such an 
instance, a neutral expert would end up doing one of two 
things. Perhaps she would support one or the other of the 
party’s positions. This might create for the factfinder the 
appearance of a consensus view, but this appearance would be 
illusory. In such circumstances, the jury would potentially  
be misled into being unduly influenced by the structurally 
unbiased expert. The jury in such cases might struggle less 
with the diverging views of the parties’ experts and simply 
choose to rely on the “neutral” expert; while its job might 
therefore be perceived as easier, it is not at all clear that the 
quality of its decisions would be meaningfully improved.  
Alternatively, the court-appointed expert might lay out 
the scientific terrain for the factfinder and situate the dispute, 
without taking sides at all. This could potentially be educa-
tional for the jury, and perhaps a court appointed expert would 
be better suited to elucidating the contours of the debate than 
the party-selected witnesses.47 But in the end, the jury would be 
left in virtually the same place it was before the court-
appointed expert assisted it: needing to decide which expert to 
believe while lacking the epistemic qualifications to assess the 
merits of the testimony.  
Those who call for neutral experts, then, at least partly 
misunderstand the nature of scientific disputes. For whenever 
there is a legitimate scientific disagreement at issue in a legal 
case, a neutral expert would either mask a legitimate dispute 
or else be unable to offer “those general truths, applicable to 
the issue, which they may treat as final and decisive,”48 for 
which Learned Hand and others have long craved. In other 
words, while neutrals might indeed offer a useful, strong check 
on extreme partisanship, this would often be an insufficient 
solution precisely because of the factfinder’s continued lack of 
epistemic competence.  
  
 47 On the tension between education and deference with respect to expert 
witnesses, see Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: 
Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993). For a case study of experts who 
“sold” their expertise to the courts in explicitly educational terms, see Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and 
the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001). 
 48 Hand, supra note 28, at 55; see Allen & Miller, supra note 47, at 1133. 
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B. The Problem of Epistemic Competence 
Let us turn, then, directly to the question of epistemic 
competence. Might there be a way to solve this problem? My 
focus, again, shall be on the most obvious potential solution: 
attempting to make use of decision-makers who themselves 
have epistemic competence. How might we do this? One option 
would of course be juries made up of experts.49  
Even putting aside any potential constitutional 
objections (for example, would a jury of experts still be a jury of 
one’s peers? would it meet the requirement that a jury come 
from “a fair cross section” of the community?), specialized juries 
would quickly run up against new difficulties. Just consider 
trying to operationalize a system of special juries designed to 
deal with concerns about epistemic competence. Who would be 
on such a jury? Imagine a toxic torts case involving a plaintiff 
alleging harm resulting from the ingestion of a pharmaceutical. 
Imagine that the key legal question in the case is causation, as 
it so often is in such cases, and imagine further that the 
plaintiff has evidence relating to causation from a variety of 
sources and scientific disciplines. Let us posit that she has two 
epidemiological studies, some evidence from chemical studies of 
the drug and related substances, an animal study or two, and 
extensive evaluations by several physicians who endeavored to 
find the cause of her ailments through “differential diagnosis.”  
If our goal is a decision-maker with epistemic 
competence, who should be eligible to sit on the jury for such a 
case? Just how much should a potential juror have to know 
about the scientific disciplines from which the evidence will 
come? Should the jury be limited to physicians and professional 
research scientists? If so, scientists from what disciplines? 
  
 49 See, e.g., Richard C. Baker, In Defense of the "Blue Ribbon" Jury, 35 IOWA 
L. REV. 409 (1950); Jeannette E. Thatcher, Why Not Use the Special Jury?, 31 MINN. L. 
REV. 232 (1947); William V. Luneberg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified 
Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of 
Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887 (1981); Rita Sutton, A More Rational 
Approach to Complex Civil Litigation in the Federal Courts: The Special Jury, 1990 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 575; Dan Drazan, The Case for Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72 
JUDICATURE 292 (1989); Kristy Lee Bertelsen, From Specialized Courts to Specialized 
Juries: Calling for Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL 
& APP. ADVOC. 1 (1998); Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 
89 YALE L.J. 1155 (1980). On the history of the use of quasi-expert juries, see generally 
James Oldham, The History of the Special (Struck) Jury in the United States and Its 
Relation to Voir Dire Practices: The Reasonable Cross-Section Requirement, and 
Peremptory Challenges, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 623 (1998) [hereinafter Oldham, 
History]; James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. (1983). 
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Should a paleontologist be permitted, or a theoretical physicist? 
What about social scientists? Clearly, the boundary-drawing 
issues would become immediately significant. An empirical 
social scientist might understand the epidemiological evidence 
at least as well as many physicians. Moreover, the evidence 
presented in the case could be disparate enough that in many 
instances no one at all would be a true epistemic insider to all 
of the scientific evidence offered. Depending on the matters at 
issue, the pool of people truly expert in any of the relevant 
areas might be rather small, and the pool of people expert in all 
of them might not even exist. Perhaps an epistemically 
competent jury need not mean that every juror has epistemic 
competence in every expert area at issue; we might be satisfied 
with a jury made up of several leading members of each of the 
subfields in which significant expert evidence was expected.  
As a thought experiment, imagining such a jury is an 
interesting prospect. But, in reality, it would raise enormous 
practical hurdles. It is simply not realistic to bring the leading 
experts in as jurors time after time. Certain kinds of expertise 
arise in trials over and over again, and it is likely that the 
segment of the population with these forms of expertise would 
become massively and unequally burdened by their jury 
obligations. Just how often could we ask busy epidemiologists 
and toxicologists, for example, to serve on juries? Meeting their 
civic duty too often could have devastating effects on both their 
income and their career! In addition, scientific sub-
communities can be small and professionally interconnected, so 
it is likely that some of the most epistemically qualified non-
testifying experts would know personally, and have views 
about, some of the testifying experts, or even have a prior 
opinion about the particular matter at issue. While these  
prior views are a direct consequence of the fact of their 
expertise, they might generate serious problems vis-à-vis our 
expectations of jurors: an expert with a significant degree of 
prior relevant knowledge might be unable to hear the evidence 
presented with a fresh and open mind. Epistemic competence 
might go hand in hand with preexisting judgments about the 
merits. 
One might argue that the preceding discussion 
unreasonably overstates the necessary degree of epistemic 
competence. Perhaps it is not necessary to be a scientist within 
the relevant field in order to have enough knowledge and 
training to evaluate the claims made in the courtroom in a 
rational manner. Perhaps the preceding discussion fails to 
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recognize the distinction between an intelligent producer and 
an intelligent consumer of knowledge—the skills necessary to 
evaluate a claim might be significantly lower than those 
needed to be a substantive contributor to the debates of the 
field. Even if we assume this to be true, now who could be 
included in our epistemically competent jury? If the case 
involves a good deal of sophisticated statistical analysis, how 
much familiarity should the jury have to have with statistical 
thinking in order to be epistemically competent? Some grad-
uate training? A college major in statistics, math, accounting, 
or some related quantitative field? Successful completion of a 
college course on the subject? Successful completion of an  
in-court quiz testing statistical knowledge, or basic numeracy?  
Our problem here is a classic dilemma of boundary-
drawing. Where do we draw the line between those deemed 
adequately epistemically competent and those who are not? If 
epistemic competence is tied with a reasonably high degree of 
precision to the matters at issue in the case, our jury system 
would become literally unworkable. By contrast, one could 
probably implement a system that required jurors to have some 
undergraduate level science training for cases involving expert 
scientific evidence. But this would create other problems. No 
longer would there be a direct tie between the factfinder’s 
knowledge and experience and the central issues in the case. 
Once that direct tie is broken, a system of this sort both smacks 
of elitism and begins to look distressingly anti-democratic. How 
confident are we that those with a minimum of one science 
class in college would actually be better, as a group, than those 
who did not meet the standard? How would they compare to 
those who went to college but did not take science? To those 
who excelled in some high school science class? To those 
without a college education but whose present employment 
relates to science or technology? To those with a particular I.Q., 
regardless of education?  
Unless we have (and perhaps even if we did have) a 
well-grounded empirical basis for believing that jurors who met 
a particular standard for prior experience with scientific 
matters would reach significantly better decisions than those 
who lacked the relevant experience, we might well think that 
other public values and commitments should prevent us from 
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heading down that path.50 In addition, those jurors who met our 
epistemic criteria (whatever they were) might be, as a group, 
demographically different from those who did not, and in ways 
that might be troubling, not only along gender, race, or 
ethnicity lines, but also in terms of beliefs relevant to the 
case—ideas about politics, notions of fault and liability, or 
other less obvious dimensions. We might be consciously giving 
up diversity on one dimension (for example, eliminating all 
those without a certain degree of scientific background), and 
simultaneously giving up diversity along dimensions about 
which we were not even aware.  
If expert juries may raise difficult concerns, expert 
judges might offer a less troubling method to ratchet up the 
legal system’s degree of epistemic competence. Judges who 
develop a specialty might be better positioned to asses the 
expert evidence adduced by parties and to guide both the 
parties and the jury through the trial process. Although no 
state, to my knowledge, has a court dedicated to cases involving 
complex expert evidence in particular, several states are 
experimenting with specialty courts or specialized judges 
within general courts devoted to business disputes or to 
complex civil litigation,51 and this category of case does 
typically involve a good deal of expert testimony. 
The early response to these innovations appears to be 
generally positive.52 However, they cannot be seen as a 
particularly robust response to the issue of epistemic 
competence. Even if we imagine (though it is far from certain) 
  
 50 Delaware has, in fact, a rarely used statute permitting the use of “special 
juries” in cases involving complex litigation. See 10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4506 
(2007). The statute is not specific about who counts as a “special juror” or what cases 
may qualify for this provision. Id. For discussion of this statute, see Oldham, History, 
supra note 49.  
 51 For an overview of materials from several states relating to specialized 
complex litigation efforts, see generally National Center for State Courts, http:// 
www.ncsconline.org/WC/CourTopics/ResourceGuide.asp?topic=SpecCt (last visited Feb. 
11, 2008). Florida has a dedicated business court in its Ninth Judicial Circuit. See 
Business Court: Ninth Judicial District, available at http://www.ninja9.org/Courts/ 
Business/Forms/ BCBrochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2008). California has a number of 
judges who now specialize in complex civil litigation. For a brief description of this 
program, see Judicial Council of California, Fact Sheet: Complex Civil Litigation 
Program (2007), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/factsheets/comlit.pdf; 
see also Complex Litigation, Key Findings from the California Pilot Program, CIVIL 
ACTION, Winter 2004, at 1; Paul Kiesel & Bryan Borys, The Cost $avings of the 
Complex Litigation Program, CAL. COURTS REV., Summer 2007, at 16. 
 52 See, e.g., Kiesel & Borys, supra note 51, at 20-21; Ronald M. George, 
Complex Civil Litigation Pilot a Success, COURT NEWS (Judicial Council of Calif.), Sept. 
2001, at 2. 
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that the judges in a court devoted to complex civil litigation 
increase their sophistication with respect to certain kinds of 
repeat-play evidence, the fact remains that in a jury trial, the 
judge does no more than rule on admissibility. The jury still 
must evaluate the evidence, and the fact that the judge may 
have grown to be a more sophisticated consumer of the expert 
evidence at issue than the typical judge will not necessarily 
translate in any obvious way to increased juror sophistication. 
To put it differently, at best these courts might lead to an 
improved set of evidentiary inputs for the jury’s considera-
tion—improved in the sense of being more likely to be 
epistemically valid. But the extent to which that would 
translate into better outputs is not obvious, given the jury’s 
own lack of epistemic competence. It probably cannot hurt, but 
it might not help much either. Bench trials with specialized 
judges would take this a step further—many have suggested, 
for example, that a “complexity exception” to the constitutional 
right to the jury trial ought to be permitted.53 
Could we go one step further and imagine a neutral, 
epistemically qualified decision-maker? Could we imagine a 
procedure akin to a bench trial, but in which the adjudicator 
was not simply a repeat-player judge in a specialized court, but 
was in fact an epistemic expert in the matters at issue? Of 
course we can imagine it, but at this point, for better or for 
worse, we are describing an adjudicatory regime that looks 
very little like our jury system. As it happens, however, we do 
have examples of precisely such a procedure in actual use: 
Some arbitration proceedings make use of an industry expert 
as an arbitrator in lieu of someone with legal expertise.54 For 
disputes with a high degree of technical complexity, or where 
industry norms are explicitly at issue, it is not uncommon for 
parties to elect to make use of an epistemically qualified 
decision-maker.55 The parties might choose someone with the 
  
 53 See sources cited supra note 51. 
 54 For discussions of industry-expert arbitrators, see Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, 
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a 
Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law]; Jennifer J. Johnson, 
Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 
N.C. L. REV. 123 (2005). Discussions with Robert Mnookin about practices in 
arbitration have also informed my understanding. 
 55 Note, however, that Bernstein found that at least in some industries the 
expert arbitrators made surprisingly little use of their insider knowledge of business 
norms within the field. Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 54, at 1771-87.  
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appropriate scientific or technical background rather than 
someone with a legal background. In a sense, then, for 
commercial and contracts disputes, or any other kinds of 
disputes for which arbitration is a viable alternative, there 
already exists an “opt-in” approach when parties deem an 
epistemically-competent evaluator to be an especially high 
priority. But while it would be interesting to know more about 
how often, and in what circumstances, parties select scientific 
or technical know-how over a legal background, this approach 
is likely to be attractive to both parties in only a limited 
number of cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Where, then, are we left? Not with solutions, to be sure, 
but perhaps with a clearer diagnosis of the dilemmas 
surrounding the use of expert evidence within an adversary 
system, and their tradeoffs. And perhaps we are left, too, with 
a bit more sympathy for Daubert, or at least a recognition that 
so long as we have our adversarial system in much its present 
form, we are inevitably going to be stuck with approaches to 
expert evidence that are imperfect, conceptually unsatisfying, 
and awkward. It may well be that the real lesson is this: those 
who believe that we might ever fully resolve—rather than 
imperfectly manage—the deep structural tensions surrounding 
both partisanship and epistemic competence that permeate the 
use of scientific evidence within our legal system are almost 
certainly destined for disappointment. This ought not to lead 
us to quiescence. It ought instead to guide us to a certain 
degree of realism and modesty about how much we can change 
about the use of expert evidence, unless we are prepared to 
make fundamental modifications to our adversarial system. 
